Understanding Judicial Interpretation
Judicial interpretation is the process by which federal courts seek to determine the meaning of the Constitution and laws passed by the legislative branch. As a fundamental function of the courts, statutory interpretation is the mechanism by which judges and justices ascertain the underlying principles and implications of laws in order to appropriately enforce and apply them. The role of judicial interpretation is as central to the law as any other function, as it ensures that the letters of written law are accurately reflected in the lived realities of the citizens whom they govern.
Indeed, this dynamic is part of the very nature of the law itself: although provisions are black-and-white, the fabric of human experience and reality into which those provisions are woven is a rich tapestry of color and nuance . The law, though expressed in writing, is not in and of itself capable of dealing with every eventuality or contingency that could arise. The role of federal courts to interpret and apply the written law acts therefore as a bridge between the rigid structure of rules and procedures on paper, and the fluid and changing realities of lived life in the real world.
In this sense, the dynamic between the law and its interpretation is continually being written anew. Judicial interpretation is a time-honored and essential element of the law, and indeed cannot be decoupled from the concept of law itself.
The Function of Federal Courts
Federal courts play a critical role in the development and interpretation of law. Through their decisions, courts give meaning and application to statutory and constitutional provisions, further shaping the landscape of law in our country and influencing the conduct, rights, and responsibilities of all Americans.
While Congress legislates and sets policy, it is the Supreme Court and other federal courts that have been charged with interpreting those laws, determining their meaning, determining their application to cases before them, and resolving conflicts that arise as to the legal meaning and rights and obligations granted (or taken away) from those statutes. For example, even if a law has been clearly enacted in response to certain factual circumstances, its application to individual cases has yet to be decided.
As a result, courts continue to resolve questions involving the minimum wage, permissible hours of work, child safety in public schools, education in public schools, religious tolerance in the workplace, reasonable accommodation for employee disabilities, rights in the workplace, and the conditions under which the government may invade the privacy of homes, each time interpreting the same law anew. While deciding cases, courts are also called on to answer threshold issues such as jurisdiction (or whether the court can hear the case), what precedential weight to give a prior published opinion, or how to conduct discovery. Even the minutiae of legal procedure, such as the format of a brief, can have unintended consequences. Federal courts fulfill these roles continuously, and the subtleties may be lost on the untrained eye. However, these carefully reasoned interpretations undoubtedly affect the way people live, work, and interact with one another.
In short, the role of the federal courts is to interpret the law and to further develop and apply the legal doctrines that come into play in the workplace and other areas.
Common Methods of Interpretation
The judicial decision-making process involves a myriad of strategies and tools, but one of the most fundamental steps in the process is the interpretation of the law as applied to the facts before the federal court. First, there are numerous ways in which the law may be interpreted – textualism, purposivism, and originalism, as well as myriad other strategies. Normally, textualism is the preferred method for federal courts, though this method is not even close to bullet-proof. That is, textualism has not led to uniformity in application despite its being the preference of many political philosophers and politicians over the years. A text – be it an amendment to the United States Constitution, or a statute – does not always lead inexorable to the conclusion that most favors its plain text or initial authors. This is so because there are several other recognized methods of legal interpretation that often suggest contrary conclusions depending on which is preferred over another in the context of any particular law.
A great deal of credit for pushing "textualism" to the forefront of legal theory must go to Justice Antonin Scalia, who provided the impetus for the textualist and originalist movements that would swell to meet the academic, legal, and political forces aligned against each of them. He has become known as a powerful voice and seemingly relentless advocate for textualism, donating his name to what would become one of the foremost judicial controversies of the modern age. Yet, despite the fact that Justice Scalia’s words carry great force even today, his textualism did not always prevail in his opinions and did not sway all of his readers. Indeed, there have been those less enamored with Justice Scalia’s approach to textualism who complained that the Justice was little more than a cabal leader intent on imposing upon the Justice system the dictates of his own carefully developed dogma.
Justice Scalia himself tacitly acknowledged the problems inherent in textualism by employing the expressio unius canon. However, the majority decision in Best v. United States, 503 U.S. 258 (1992), demonstrates how even the use expressio unius can be countered. The argument is simply that in making a choice between two alternatives, the court has implicitly decided against the one it has not chosen. Justice Scalia’s opinion in Best found that a structure built primarily from prefabricated and modular plastic walls and supported by more traditional steel pillars, does not transfer property belonging to the United States to a tenant and did not need to be removed prior to the tenant vacating the premises. The argument is so simple, and yet so devastating, that the majority was left with no choice but to rule against what had been argued by the dissent in the case, which would have imposed a heavy financial burden on the United States. Despite the majority opinion’s flaw against which the expressio unius canon is directed, the majority ultimately prevailed.
The great irony to Best is that Justice Scalia himself authored the dissenting opinion, and he was one among an unlikely group of Justices who, over the decades, have rejected the notion that the Supreme Court should be a legislature. The point is that exactly the opposite of the real argument presented by the dissent was adopted by the majority, and while textualism certainly cannot suffer solely for the dissenter’s label, the problems with textualism can be illustrated by looking to the decision itself. Justice Scalia was, shall we say, mischaracterizing what he believed to be the majority opinion, but the majority simply had no choice but to reject his argument; the underlying flaws and inherent conflicts meant that such a decision must be best interpreted as one made by the dissent in that case. Simply put, for Justice Scalia, the majority was wrong, and the dissent remains the better argument.
The thing about textualism is that the argument, itself, is so simple that it may be employed too often as a simple solution to any law or regulation that a federal court is called upon to interpret. Given the power that the Supreme Court holds within its composite predilection and the weight that may be given to its decisions formed by a bare minimum of five Justices, the problem with textualism really comes down to the role of the Supreme Court itself and whether it accepts that its role is to be a co-equal branch of government. Indeed, if the role of the Court is to function merely as a medial institution applying the laws enacted by the legislative and executive branches of government according to their words, then textualism remains quite sound. On the other hand, if the role of the Court is to create and impose with ultimate authority the interpretation that best furthers the United States Constitution, is the legislative process then necessitated?
Seminal Cases and Interpretative Results
The Supreme Court’s interpretative approach has manifested in a series of landmark cases that illustrate the complexities and consequences of DOJ’s stance on statutory interpretation. One notable example is Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), which invalidated a key formula used to determine which local governments were required to obtain federal approval prior to changing their voting processes in jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination. The decision was based on application of a statutorily defined "equal access" test, interpreting it as only requiring "equal access" at the time of the Voting Rights Act’s passage, and not equality in the current voting environment. Because Congress failed to adopt a new voting rights formula since 1965, parts of the Act became outdated and burdensome, and its discriminatory enforcement was held unconstitutional.
Another important decision was Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. ___ (2016), which invalidated two Texas laws that severely limited a woman’s right to choose by subjecting her to unnecessary surgical procedures and risks. The majority held that the laws imposed an "undue burden" because they seriously hindered women’s access to abortion services for a purpose unrelated to the protection of women’s health, by closing most of Texas’ clinics and causing some 5,000 women to self-harm to end their pregnancies. The majority grounded its analysis in judicial precedent and congressional purpose , finding that the laws violated the 14th Amendment’s prohibition against treating women unequally. Had the DOJ not taken the position that the Court’s interpretation was not harmonious with Congressional intent, Texas’ laws would have prevailed.
Several other major Supreme Court decisions are worth noting because of their impact on society and the express language used in the decisions. In Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015), the Supreme Court granted same-sex couples the right to marry in state recognition of their union. In this advisor opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel, DOJ expressly states that while the precedent was founded on Constitutional grounds, it diverged from Section Two of the DOMA aimed at only regulating marriage at the federal level. In Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), the Supreme Court declined to grant non-profit companies a religious exemption under the ACA, and instead offered an alternative accommodation, citing that the accommodation replaced an earlier requirement under the statute that clergy affiliated with these religious institutions be the primary informant of the plans. This alternative refused to bind religious institutions while still serving the ACA’s goal of aiding employees under those institutions’ religious governance. The Court now awaits a final challenge to the accommodation made that previous year in Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, No. 16-402 (2017).
Significance for Precedent, Policy and Society
The interpretative decisions made by Federal Courts do not exist in a contextual vacuum. Rather, the string of individual decisions serve to update and recalibrate the overarching framework of Federal jurisprudence over time. Because these interpretations are later administered to govern the behavior of the citizenry, these decisions are not only binding upon the litigants involved in any individual dispute. Indeed, the ripples of a Federal Court interpretation often extend out to transform the baseline standards of conduct for years, if not decades, to come.
While the decisions of the Federal Courts are not binding precedent upon the legislature, the interpretative decisions of Federal Courts are closely watched by all stakeholders in the legislative process. Likewise, each of the states and territories that comprise the Federation maintains its own judicial system. Though the legal standards governing the operation of a territory necessarily differ at times from the standards applicable to a Federal statute, when considered in the aggregate the interplay between the Federal legal framework and that of the controlling local jurisdiction creates an expansive legal landscape that is of endless interest to the legislatures.
In this regard, it is important to note that the level of influence which the Federal Courts exhibit upon the legislative process is, at times, reciprocal in nature. That is to say, there are times in which the Court interprets a statute in a particular manner to address an unanticipated consequence, and thereafter the legislature amends the existing statute to either codify the interpretation or to modify it in some manner. A recent example of this occurred in 2017, in which the Senate passed legislation eliminating the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine from Healthcare Space Title IX statutes. The legislation codified the Federal Court interpretation — which had been based under Title IX’s prevailing principle that the administrator of a federally funded institution could not, by design, discriminate based upon sex by treating men and women differently with respect to any program that stemmed from the institution receiving funding – and thereby all but eliminated the ability of a Federal Court to issue a decision overturning its own codification.
Federal courts have held significant sway in matters involving the separation of church and state, abortion rights, prisoners’ rights, etc. In addition to the innumerable ways in which Federal Court decisions can reshape the nation’s legal landscape, the decisions of the Federal Courts can – and often do – influence whether or not a piece of legislation will ultimately be adopted.
Controversial Interpretations in Federal Court
The interpretation of law by federal courts is not without its controversies, particularly as political division in the United States grows. Areas such as immigration enforcement, healthcare, standards in employment, and access to legal services have all been impacted by the federal judiciary, albeit in different ways. Perhaps the most contested area of interpretation is that of judicial activism ("The willingness of an activist judge to alter constitutional interpretations is akin to that of an activist legislator: a rejection of the rule of law." Meyer v. Grant). Scholars and politicians both side with either strict constructionists or loose constructionists when it comes to judicial legislation. While some see judicial activism as a necessary function of the federal judiciary, others see it as an affront to the rule of law and to the Constitution itself. Thus, the question of judicial activism is particularly contentious and allegations that the federal judiciary engages in it has a tendency to polarize the American public. Judicial activism is defined narrowly, as "the propensity of a judge to reach decisions that simply embodied his or her personal preferences rather than that of the actual law." On the opposite side of this is judicial restraint, which sits in stark opposition to judicial activism. Judicial restraint "encourages judges to limit the exercise of their power, basing decisions on precedent and grounded in the Constitution," meaning that a judge is restrained when they avoid broad interpretations of the law and focus on narrowly applying relevant precedent. Judicial activism can be considered a recent phenomenon of the federal judiciary, with scholars attempting to identify a time in which it began. Some dating it from the New Deal to post-Civil War, others from the Warren Court to the Burger Court, and others still simply refusing to place it within a certain timeframe. Regardless of its exact origins, scholars agree that judicial activism is more frequently employed than ever before , which is aided by the heightened development of the law over the past century and the stark and systemic increase in federal court cases from 1959 to 1990 (Schubert 1997). Critics of judicial activism argue that judicial activism violates the rule of law and misrepresents the Constitution as it is written. Critics of judicial activism argue that it is fundamentally undemocratic, as judicial activists are "unelected officials who wield extraordinary power in the social fabric of the nation" (Springer 2009). Also, the American public loses faith in the judicial system if they feel that they are not being represented in court, which most often occurs in instances of judicial activism. Finally, critics of judicial activism argue that judicial activists do not engage in any sort of interpretation whatsoever, but rather ‘legislate from the bench,’ which is itself a violation of the Constitution, as it is Congress’ duty to legislate, not the judiciary’s. Proponents of the theory of judicial activism argue that judicial activism helps protect the individual from the big government of the state. They argue that judicial activism sees the Constitution not as sacrosanct, but as a living document that the people may, through their courts, use to "fix" government. They also argue that judicial activism allows for fair and equal treatment for different classes of people, providing minority classes the ability to forego anti-discrimination measures, which allowing the court system to do what it was created for. As one might imagine, the existence of judicial activism is hotly contested between strict and loose constructionists. The debate is particularly contested because if judicial activism truly does violate the rule of law, then how are courts able to employ it so often and effectively? Conversely, if judicial activism is a respected practice among the federal judiciary, how could it be so fiercely criticized? In both instances, the critics and the proponents of the theory both have a point in the existence of judicial activism, leading the American public to be largely polarized on the issue.